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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW -

KOSILEK V. MALONEY: IN PRISON WHILE

IMPRISONED IN THE BODY OF THE OPPOSITE SEX: EXAMINING THE
ISSUE OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" PRESENTED BY AN
INCARCERATED TRANSSEXUAL

INTRODUCTION

When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corre
sponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well being. . .. The rationale for this principle is simple
enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power
so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on
state action set by the Eighth Amendment. ... 1

While the rationale for this principle may be simple, the issues
raised by the incarceration of those experiencing intense Gender
Identity Disorder (hereinafter "GID") are not. Inmates experienc
ing the rare psychological condition of GID pose serious and diffi
cult questions to those responsible for their medical care and, in
certain circumstances, prison personnel may be found to have vio
lated the constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish
ments" by not providing proper treatment for the inmate. 2 The
case of Kosilek v. Maloney3 addressed the unique issues involved
with the treatment of transsexual inmates in a comprehensive way,
which had not previously been done by a court. The court's general
approach and thorough analysis of the issues presented is the sub
ject of this Note.
Kosilek was decided by a federal district court in Massachu
1. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989».
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
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setts and is significant in a couple of ways. First, it provides the
most comprehensive analysis of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in the context of incarcerating transsexuals. No other court at the
federal level has considered this difficult issue as thoroughly as in
Kosilek. Second, it provides guidance to prison administrators
faced with the difficult task of incarcerating transsexuals. The opin
ion can be viewed as establishing a framework for prison adminis
trators to be used in order to avoid violating the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. The decision is constitutionally sound
given prior case law and the current understanding of GID and its
potential seriousness. Therefore, the case may have additional sig
nificance outside of the First Circuit.4
Michelle Kosilek is, for the most part, an unsympathetic liti
gant. Kosilek is a convicted murderer currently serving a life-sen
tence, without the possibility of parole, in a medium-security
Massachusetts prison for the murder of his former wife, Cheryl Mc
Caul. s Kosilek is anatomically male and suffers from GID, a rare
psychological condition marked by intense and persistent desires to
live life as a member of the opposite sex. 6 Kosilek has been incar
cerated at MCI-Norfolk since 1994 and has been in the custody of
the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "DOC") since 1993.7
During the period in which the DOC has been responsible for
Kosilek, he attempted suicide twice and also attempted to castrate
himself.8 Kosilek's unique condition placed those responsible for
his care, and ultimately DOC Commissioner Michael Maloney, in a
difficult position.
On the one hand, the responsible officials knew that Kosilek
was in need of psychiatric care, having been diagnosed by a profes
sional with experience in treating GID.9 Therefore, under the
Eighth Amendment, DOC personnel could not neglect his medical
condition. The DOC also knew that if Kosilek was not treated
properly the risk of suicide would be great.lO On the other hand,
4. Indeed Kosilek has already provided guidance to federal courts addressing the
difficult problems raised by the incarceration of transsexuals. See Barrett v. Coplan, 292
F. Supp. 2d 281 (Dist. N.H. 2003); Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
5. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 164. The particular facts of the case also led the
jury to find Kosilek guilty of extreme atrocity in the murder of McCaul. See Common
wealth v. Kosilek, 668 N.E.2d 808, 811-12 (Mass. 1996).
6. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
7. Id. at 164.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 190.
10. Id.
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the treatment options involved in treating OlD were politically con
troversial, expensive, and potentially disruptive of prison security.ll
Fearful of the potential political backlash and concerned with the
administration of the prison, Commissioner Maloney decided not to
provide the recommended course of treatment and claimed that the
DOC was not constitutionally obligated to do SO.12 In response,
Kosilek brought a civil rights action to enforce his Eighth Amend
ment right to medical care.13
Determining whether an Eighth Amendment violation oc
curred was a close question. Although the Eighth Amendment pro
vides substantial protection for prison officials, as Kosilek explains,
it is not impenetrable. In the end, the court found that Commis
sioner Maloney had not violated the Eighth Amendment because
his actions in dealing with Kosilek's condition were not the result of
"deliberate indifference."14 Despite holding in favor of the DOC,
the Kosilek decision can be viewed as a warning to those responsi
ble for the care of transsexual inmates. The decision in part pro
vides what should, and should not, be done by prison officials when
faced with the difficult situation of incarcerating persons with
01D.15 The court's thorough examination of such a thorny legal
problem is constitutionally sound as the law exists today; thus
courts and prison officials should be aware of Kosilek in order to
assure compliance with the Eighth Amendment and thereby avoid
potential liability.
This Note addresses the various issues involved in the Kosilek
decision, including whether transsexual inmates should be allowed
individualized medical evaluations; whether prison policies which
severely restrict access to treatment are proper; the role of political
consequences in the decision process used by prison officials re
sponsible for the medical care of prisoners; and the issue of cost as a
factor of constitutional magnitude. To achieve this end, this Note
11.

at 162.
at 170-71.
13.
at 159.
14.
at 191.
15. [d. at 160-61. The court expanded on what adequate care entails: "Adequate
care requires treatment by qualified personnel, who provide services that are of a qual
ity acceptable when measured by prudent professional standards in the community.
Adequate care is tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs and is based on medi
cal considerations." [d. The court also mentioned that it would not be "permissible to
deny an inmate adequate medical care because it is costly. In recognition of this, prison
officials at times authorize CAT scans, dialysis, and other forms of expensive medical
care required to diagnose or treat familiar forms of serious illness." [d.
12.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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begins by discussing several related concepts. Part I of this Note
concerns the judicial construction of the cruel and unusual clause of
the Eighth Amendment and examines the deliberate indifference
standard, which is used to assess whether a violation of the Amend
ment has occurred. This Part provides analysis of the important
developments in Eighth Amendment interpretation, including the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Estelle v. Gamble,16 and pro
vides discussion of deliberate indifference in the medical treatment
context. Part II includes a discussion of GID and provides analysis
of earlier cases that involved challenges brought by incarcerated
transsexuals. Part III discusses the facts of the Kosilek case as well
as the court's holding. Finally, Part IV explores the Kosilek opinion
and provides analysis of the decision. The purpose of this Note is to
examine the impact the Kosilek decision may have on future actions
brought by incarcerated transsexualsP This Note proposes tJ;1at the
Kosilek approach serve as a model for future cases because it best
comports with Supreme Court precedent and notions which under
lie the Eighth Amendment.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Judicial Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the
Modern Era

The roots of the contemporary deliberate indifference stan
dard, which is used to determine whether a prison official has vio
lated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, can be traced back to the middle part of
the twentieth century. It was around this time that the essential
problem regarding the scope of the Eighth Amendment began to be
considered.1 8 Despite the unresolved issue regarding the applica
bility of the Amendment to the states,19 the Supreme Court case of
16. 429 u.s. 97 (1976).
17. See supra note 4.
18. See Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660, 675 (1962) ("The command of the
Eighth Amendment banning 'cruel and unusual punishments,' stems for the Bill of
Rights of 1688. . .. And it is applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted). During this period, the
Fourteenth Amendment was "assumed" to be the principle basis for applying the
Eighth Amendment to the states. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947).
This "assumption" would not be formally confirmed by the Supreme Court until years
later.
19. Francis, 329 U.S. at 462 (The Court stated that "we shall examine the circum
stances under the assumption, but without so deciding, that violation of the principles of
the Fifth and Eight Amendments ... would be violative of the .due process clause of the
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Francis v. Resweber20 made important, albeit limited, interpreta
tions concerning the potential for liability under the Amendment.2 1
1\vo significant findings the Court made were that the Amendment
prohibited "the wanton infliction of pain" and that a violation of
the Amendment could not result from an "unforeseeable acci
dent."22 The Court interpreted the prohibition of "cruel and unu
sual punishment" to involve a mens rea component, and this
concept would ultimately serve an important role in the construc
tion of the Eighth Amendment. The mens rea requirement would
be formally accepted by the Supreme Court twenty-nine years later
in the landmark Eighth Amendment case of Estelle v. Gamble. 23
1.

Estelle v. Gamble

In Estelle, the Supreme Court established a framework to
guide courts in determining whether an Eighth Amendment viola
tion occurred. 24 For the first time, the Supreme Court began the
difficult task of restricting the limits of the indefinite cruel and unu
sual clause in a meaningful way.25 The standard established by the
Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment's guiding principles,
announced by earlier Supreme Court decisions,26 which viewed the
Fourteenth Amendment. "); see also LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 7, 14 (1975).
20. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
21. Francis, 329 U.S. at 463.
22. ld. at 463-64.
23. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.").
24. ld.
25. [d. at 105-06. The Court's opinion makes clear that not
every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. . .. In order to state a cogniza
ble claim a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evi
dence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the
Eight Amendment.
[d. Despite the fact that Estelle involved allegations of inadequate medical care, the
analysis that the Court set out would become the appropriate standard for most types of
mistreatment alleged by inmate plaintiffs and would extend beyond the medical treat
ment context. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("[O]bduracy and wan
tonness ... characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, whether the conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of con
finement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous
cellblock.").
26. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370-74 (1910). In Weems, the ma
jority opinion stated:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an

224

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:219

Amendment as progressive and concerning "evolving standards of
decency that mark progress in a maturing society."27 The deliber
ate indifference standard crafted by the Court can therefore be con
sidered an attempt to reconcile the lofty notions of "evolving
standards of decency" and "dignity of man," which underlie the
Eighth Amendment, with a specific legal analysis with which courts
could work. 28 The resulting method was one that assessed not only
objective criteria but also the subjective motivation of the responsi
ble prison official, against whom allegations were lodged. This
combination of the objective and subjective became the basis for
determining whether a valid Eighth Amendment claim exists. 29
By establishing that only a finding of deliberate indifference, or
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," would constitute a
violation of the Eighth Amendment,3° Estelle precluded liability for
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessa
rily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enact
ments, designed to meet passing occasions.
Id. at 373. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In Trap, the Court again
recognized that the language in the Amendment does little in the way of providing
precise meaning. In reversing a sentence that would have taken away the citizenship of
the native born petitioner who had been convicted of wartime desertion, the Court
stated that: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to
assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Id. at 100.
The Court also stated that: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101.
27. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. See also Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
28. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to seri
ous medical needs. It is only such indifference .that can offend 'evolving standards of
decency' in violation of the Eight Amendment.").
29. Id. at 101, 106 (acknowledging that more recent Supreme Court decisions go
beyond obvious physical punishments, which would of course violate the Amendment,
and requiring a showing of "deliberate indifference" in order for liability to be imposed
under the Eighth Amendment).
30. Id. at 104-05. The majority stated:
We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' ... pro
scribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of
how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury
states a cause of action under § 1983.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the harm to prisoners so long as responsible prison officials acted
appropriately.31 The deliberate indifference standard also ad
vanced the mens rea concept mentioned in Francis to now require a
culpable state of mind beyond mere neglect. 32 Following Estelle, it
has become clear that the Court has accepted the deliberate indif
ference standard as the proper measure of whether an Eight
Amendment violation exists in practically all aspects of prison
administration. 33
The Estelle decision did little in terms of defining the scope of
liability under the deliberate indifference standard. Estelle did,
however, confirm "that the Amendment proscribes more than
physically barbarous punishments. "34 At the same time, the opin
ion recognized the aspiring beliefs of humanity and decency, which
underlie the Amendment. 35 The standard announced in Estelle can
therefore be seen as a flexible method to be used by courts on an ad
hoc basis when evaluating penal measures against the "broad ideal
istic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and de
cency."36 To further understand "deliberate indifference" and its
31. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("To be cruel and unusual
punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. This reading of the
Clause underlies our decision in Estelle.").
32. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited "the wanton infliction of pain" and that no liability would exist
for an "unforeseeable accident"); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (accepting that acci
dents, whether in the medical context or not, are insufficient to satisfy the mens rea
component of the Eighth Amendment).
33. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (citing Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1,6-7 (1992» ("[A]pplication of the deliberate indifference standard is inap
propriate ... when officials stand accused of using excessive physical force."). Accord
ing to the Farmer Court:
In such situations, where the decisions of prison officials are made "in haste,
under pressure, and frequently without the lUXUry of a second chance," an
Eighth Amendment claimant must show more than "indifference," deliberate
or otl1erwise. The claimant must show that officials applied force "maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm . . . ."
Id. at 835 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,303
(1991) (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (C.A.4, N.C. 1987» ("Whether one char
acterizes the treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confine
ment, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate
to apply the 'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle.").
34. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. In Wilson, the Court acknowledged that
determining an individual's intent depends on the circumstances. Id. (citing Whitley,
475 U.S. at 320) ("[O]ur cases say that the offending conduct must be wanton. Whitley
makes clear, however, that in this context wantonness does not have a fixed meaning
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potential scope of liability, it is helpful to analyze other Supreme
Court cases that have applied the standard.
B.

Judicial Construction of the Deliberate Indifference Standard

Further clarification of "deliberate indifference" came in 1991,
when the Court applied the standard in Wilson v. Seiter 37 and dis
tinguished the case from an earlier decision in Rhodes v. Chap
man. 38 While both cases involved complaints relating to conditions
of confinement,39 in Rhodes the Court never thoroughly assessed
the prison official's subjective motivation because the claim failed
during the analysis of the objective component of deliberate indif
ference. 4o Wilson established that after a determination based on
an objective injury is made, a court must then assess the constraints
placed on the official in order to determine whether the appropriate
level of "wantonness" is present.41 Thus, Wilson's clarification of
Rhodes aided in the interpretation of the deliberate indifference
analysis by setting out a two-step inquiry. First, under Rhodes,
courts must consider the objective factors relating to the claim.42 If
there are insufficient objective indicia the claim fails immediately at
that point. 43 However, if the claim survives analysis under the ob
jective component, courts must consider the subjective
component. 44
The most in-depth explanation of deliberate indifference came
in Farmer v. Brennan,45 which is also the only Supreme Court deci
but must be determined with 'due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against
which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.' ").
37. 501 U.S. at 294.
38. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
39. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 29.6; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-49.
40. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (finding claim which alleged "double ceiling" as vio
lative of constitutional right lacking because no sufficient medical, sanitary, or dietary
deprivation existed). See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (clari
fying Rhodes to make certain that it was not to be understood as a departure from the
subjective requirement of deliberate indifference, and reaffirming the notion that a vio
lation of the Eighth Amendment requires a subjective component).
41. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 ("[A]ssuming the conduct is harmful enough to satisfy
the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, whether it can be character
ized as 'wanton' depends upon the constraints facing the official.") (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 298.
43. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
44. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01. Staying true to deliberate indifference, the Court
stated that the subjective requirement, on the part of the prison official, partly deter
mined whether an Eighth Amendment violation existed. Id.
45. 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (admitting that deliberate indifference had never
been thoroughly explained).
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sion involving a transsexual litigant. Farmer augmented the delib
erate indifference definition by asserting that it encompassed "more
than mere negligence" but less than "acts or omissions for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result."46
The Court added "that acting or failing to act with deliberate indif
ference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk."47 This statement
suggests that deliberate indifference is closely related to the notion
of recklessness; however, the Court was uncomfortable with this
notion, in part because of the varying legal interpretations of the
latter term. 48 Consequently, the Court rejected a deliberate indif
ference definition that would be analogous to a civil law interpreta
tion of recklessness 49 and in the process refined deliberate
indifference, expanding the concept beyond the recklessness notion
found in the criminal law. 50
The Court's justification for this expansion of deliberate indif
ference, beyond the bounds of both criminal and civil law interpre
tations of recklessness, ultimately related to the language in the
Eighth Amendment itself.51 At the heart of deliberate indifference
is the understanding that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not out
law cruel and unusual 'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual
46. [d. ("With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of neg
ligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the Courts of Appeals have
routinely equated deliberate indifference with recklessness.").
47. [d. at 836.
48.. [d. at 836-37. The Court compared the civil law definition of recklessness
with the criminal law definition:
The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a
duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
either known or so obvious that it should be known. The criminal law, how
ever, generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards
a risk of harm of which he is aware.
[d. (citation omitted).
49. [d. at 837 (rejecting argument that liability should be found because of the
obvious and unreasonable risk allegedly posed by the responsible official).
50. [d. The Farmer Court recognized the criminal law notion of recklessness to
mean disregarding a risk of harm of which the person is aware. Ultimately, the Court
expanded this definition by not only requiring an awareness of risk, but also by requir
ing the individual to draw an inference that would make the official completely aware
of the risk.
Sl. [d. ("This [deliberate indifference] approach comports best with the text of
the Amendment as our cases have interpreted it."). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 300 (1991) ("[T]he source of the intent requirement is not predilections of this
Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual
punishment.").
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'punishments.' "52 In the end, Farmer unmistakably stressed the im
portance of establishing the requisite subjective motivation on the
part of the responsible official in order for an Eighth Amendment
violation to exist. 53 Farmer thus once again reaffirmed the notion
that deliberate indifference cannot be found by the fact-finder with
out a definite determination that the responsible official acted, or
"punished" the prisoner, with a culpable state of mind. 54 Notwith
standing this overall emphasis on the subjective component, the
Farmer opinion also acknowledged that objective aspects of incar
ceration were relevant and could amount to an important societal
interest. 55
The emphasis on the subjective motivation of the prison offi
cial was not a novel concept, but was nonetheless controversial. In
Francis, the majority opined that the Eighth Amendment prohib
ited "the wanton infliction of pain."56 In that case, the dissenting
justices recognized the inherent difficulty of analyzing the actions of
the individual responsible for the resulting harm in terms of motiva
tion, deliberation, and intent. 57 The dissenters presciently identi
fied an issue, which would be debated by future justices58 until
52. Farmer, 511 U.S at 837.
53. Id. at 838 ("[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases
be condemned as the infliction of punishment.").
54. See id. at 837; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 ("If the pain inflicted is not formally
meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.").
55. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 ("An act or omission unaccompanied by knowl
edge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage,
and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The common
law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis.").
56. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
57. Id. Referring to the attempted electrocution of the prisoner and the subjec
tive component as it relates to the executioner, the Court stated that "[l]ack of intent
that the first application be less than fatal is not material. The intent of the executioner
cannot lessen the torture or excuse the result. It was the statutory duty of the state
officials to make sure that there was not failure." Id.
58. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated: "I agree with
Justice Stevens that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even if
no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun also believed that deliberate indifference was
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Amendment and stated "there is no rea
son to believe that, in adopting the Eighth Amendment, the Framers intended to pro
hibit cruel and unusual punishments only when they were inflicted intentionally." Id. at
856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Using a more textual critique, Justice Thomas consid
ered the Estelle opinion mistaken because the harm in that case had nothing to do with
the sentence which individual received. Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas
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settled by the majority in Estelle and reaffirmed in Farmer. Estelle,
appropriate or not, requires the trier of fact to determine the intent
or wantonness of the responsible prison official before imposing lia
bility.59 Despite arguments against applying the deliberate indiffer
ence standard,60 Estelle remains controlling and prior dissenters,
from Justices Thomas to Stevens, have concurred in cases requiring
an assessment of the official's subjective motivation and considered
them as consistent with precedent. 61

C.

The Deliberate Indifference Standard in the Medical Treatment
Context

Estelle established that it was "elementary" to recognize the
"government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it
is punishing by incarceration."62 Therefore, in the medical care
context, the decision can be seen as an acceptance of the long
standing idea that society itself bears the burden of caring for the
criminal element of society.63 Estelle also affirmed that knowledge
interpreted the scope of the Amendment as involving only the sentence, or "punish
ment" which is imposed on the individual, and not the prison conditions in which the
convict eventually finds himself. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Wilson, 501 U.S.
at 306 (White, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens signed onto
Justice White's concurrence, which argued that the deliberate indifference standard is
inappropriate in determining whether the conditions of prison violate the Eighth
Amendment. Id. (White, J., concurring). The justices' main concern was that prison
officials could escape liability even when they had knowledge of serious deprivations to
prisoners, but were unable to remedy the deprivations because of some aspect outside
their control and thus not liable because they lacked the requisite intent or wantonness.
Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). It seems that the fundamental disagreement relates
directly to interpreting the purpose of the Amendment and whether the prohibition of
"cruel and unusual punishments" was intended to regulate improper behavior by prison
officials or whether it serves to provide a broad protection from harm irrespective of
motive, intent, or wantonness. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 857 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun stated:
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not adopted to protect prison
officials with arguably benign intentions from lawsuits. The Eighth Amend
ment guarantees each prisoner that reasonable measures will be taken to en
sure his safety ... the Eighth Amendment [may be] violated regardless of
whether there is an easily identifiable wrongdoer with poor intentions.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
60. See Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provi
sion of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45
VAND. L. REV. 921, 937-38 (1992) (arguing that Eighth Amendment challenges might
be more appropriately analyzed under a gross negligence standard).
61. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858-62 (Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) (con
currence was hesitant).
62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
63. Id. at 103-04. For Estelle,
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of a prisoner's need for medical care, combined with a refusal to
provide such care, would constitute deliberate indifference and thus
violate the Eighth Amendment. 64 However, many cases, including
Kosilek, do not fit neatly within this kind of scenario, and therefore,
a more in depth understanding of deliberate indifference in the
medical treatment context is necessary.
In Estelle, the Court was certain that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited responsible officials from being deliberately indifferent
towards serious medical needs of prisoners. 65 The decision came at
a time when the "hands off" approach, which had been used exten
sively in the past, had begun to diminish. 66 During the "hands off"
era, in response to Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners
whose central allegation challenged the discretion of the medical
authority, most courts deferred to the decisions of the medical per
sonne1.67 However, there had never been a total disregard for pris
oners' right to medical treatment. Even before Estelle, courts had
found that an intentional failure to provide medical treatment for
prisoners would constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment.68
Since the deliberate indifference standard was announced, the
Court has stated that a prison official responsible for providing
medical care would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment if the
prisoner could demonstrate that there was a "serious medical need"
The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the com
mon-law view that "it is but just that the public be required to care for the
prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for
himself."
Id. (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926».
64. Id. at 104-06. The Estelle Court concluded that "an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain' or to be 'repugnant to the conscious of mankind.'" Id. at 105-06.
However, it also noted that deliberate indifference can be "manifested by prison doc
tors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally deny
ing or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment once
prescribed." Id. at 104-05.
65. Id. at 104 ("[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. ").
66. Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 (1963) (explaining the "hands off" doc
trine as "a denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitions from prisoners
alleging some form of mistreatment or contesting some deprivation undergone during
imprisonment").
67. See BERKSON, supra note 19, at 132.
68. See Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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which the official intentionally neglected. 69 It makes no difference,
for purposes of Eighth Amendment liability, that the underlying
complaint concerns the inadequacy of medical treatment as op
posed to a total lack thereof.7° There is no deliberate indifference
exception made for claims based on inadequacies of medical treat
menU 1 Therefore, the prisoner must simply prove that he or she
suffered from a serious illness and that the prison official acted with
the requisite culpable intent in not providing treatment or by pro
viding inadequate treatment. Each of these elements will be dis
cussed in turn.
1.

The Medical Need That the Prisoner Alleges Has Not
Been Adequately Treated Must Be "Sufficiently
Serious"

The Supreme Court has succinctly stated that the "deprivation
alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently serious'" in order for a
violation of the Eighth Amendment to exist. 72 The Court has also
stated that the objective requirement would be fulfilled when the
responsible official's act or omission resulted "in the denial of the
'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.' "73 It is important
to appreciate the use of the word "minimal" because there is no
doubt among the legal community that prisoners are not entitled to
ideal care. 74 The "sufficiently serious" requirement applies equally
to allegations involving physical ills as well as claims concerning
psychological illness. There is no dispute among courts as to the
similarity between physical and psychological problems.75 Both re
69. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
70. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (finding "no significant distinc
tion between claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate
conditions of confinement").
71. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to seri
ous medical needs. ").
72. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at
298).
73. [d. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
74. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349 ("The Constitution
'does not mandate comfortable prisons,' but neither does it permit inhumane ones
....")); Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1493-94 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1987); Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp.
1256, 1305 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
75. See Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The extension of
the eighth amendment's protection from physical health needs, as presented in Estelle,
to mental health needs is appropriate because, as courts have noted, there is 'no under·
lying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological
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quire adequate medical treatment. Thus, a prison official who ex
hibits deliberate indifference towards a prisoner's mental health
needs would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment,76
Courts agree that "a condition that a reasonable physician
would deem worthy of treatment and which, if left untreated, could
result in further significant injury to the inmate or the wanton inflic
tion of pain" constitutes a sufficiently serious need. 77 Categories of
serious medical conditions recognized by courts have been those
involving "highly contagious or dangerous conditions for which
treatment is mandated by statutes;78 those conditions diagnosed as
serious by medical personnel and which threaten substantial harm if
left untreated;79 ... chronic disabilities and afflictions;80 and condi
tions which may result in serious injury when requests for their
treatment are denied."81 Significantly, a serious medical need that
has been misdiagnosed by a medical professional could not amount
to deliberate indifference, and thus, no Eighth Amendment viola
tion would result. 82
or psychiatric counterpart."') (citation omitted); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th
Cir. 1988); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983).
76. See Torraco, 923 F.2d at 234; Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1990);
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990).
77. See Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted);
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Simkus v. Granger, No. 91
6303,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16751, *5 (4th Cir. July 30,1991); Boateng v. O'Toole, No.
Civ.A.96-12015-RGS, 1997 WL 828 778, at *1 (D. Mass. May 30, 1997).
78. Victoria Pappas, Note, In Prison With AIDS: The Constitutionality Of Mass
Screening and Segregation Policies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 151, 164 (1988) (citing French
v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910,918 (S.D. Ind. 1982». See also Damon Martin, Comment,
State Prisoners' Rights to Medical Treatment: Merely Elusive, or Wholly Illusory?, 8
BLACK L.J. 427, 441 (1983).
79. Pappas, supra note 78, at 164 (citing West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir.
1978); Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1974); Derrickson v. Keve,
390 F. Supp. 905, 906-07 (D. Del. 1975».
80. Id. (citing Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1983); Hamilton v.
Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1980); McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F. Supp. 117, 120
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Speed v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 426, 428 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Johnson v.
Harris, 479 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1979».
81. Id. (citing Freeman, 503 F.2d at 1017).
82. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). According to Estelle,
in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" or to be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Thus, a complaint
that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condi
tion does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Id.
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Evaluating the Treatment the Prisoner Receives

The next step in determining whether a violation of the Eighth
Amendment exists requires an evaluation of the treatment that the
prisoner actually received. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has confirmed "that 'the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and
the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment.' "83 On the other hand, it is clear
that mere disagreement with the chosen medical treatment cannot
be the basis of a cognizable constitutional claim. 84 When courts
consider these two contradictory notions in deciding Eighth
Amendment claims brought by transsexual prisoners, problems
often arise.
For example, in Kosilek, the court concluded that the appropri
ate method for determining whether the prisoner received adequate
treatment should involve an evaluation of the treatment in relation
to the professional medical standards practiced in the community.85
The court went on to state that the treatment a prisoner receives
should be individualized and specific to the unique medical require
ments of that prisoner. 86 However, this is a somewhat novel strat
egy, and courts have been more prone to utilize a balancing system
and consider a host of factors before determining whether an in
mate possesses a valid constitutional claim. 87 In the end, the deter
83. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)).
84. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980); Bowring v. Godwin,
551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973);
Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1970); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp.
2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).
85. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 160 ("Adequate care requires treatment by quali
fied personnel, who provide services that are of quality acceptable when measured by
prudent professional standards in the community. ").
86. Id. ("Adequate care is tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs and is
based on medical considerations.").
87. See Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981). The court recited fac
tors which have been considered relevant to a balancing approach as:
the seriousness of the prisoner's illness, the need for immediate treatment, the
likely duration of his incarceration, the possibility of substantial harm caused
by postponed treatment, the prospects of some cure or substantial improve
ment in his condition, and the extent to which the prisoner presents a risk of
danger to himself or other inmates. On the other hand, the court should con
sider the availability and expense of providing psychiatric treatment and the
effect of such unusual care on ordinary jail administration. In balancing the
needs of the prisoner against the burden on the penal system, [courts] should
be mindful that the essential test is one of medical necessity and not one sim
ply of desirability.
Id.
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mination depends on the particular facts - especially the extent of
treatment involved. 88 When GID is at issue, the analysis becomes
more complicated. In order to comprehend the difficulties that
prison administrators, and eventually courts, face in dealing with
constitutional challenges brought by transsexual inmates, it is help
ful to understand GID and its potentially serious effects.

II.

GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER

In the past, GID has been referred to by courts as "gender
dysphoria" or "transsexualism," which are older terms used to iden
tify the condition. 89 A simplistic definition of GID might character
ize the condition as involving a belief that one is "trapped" in the
body of the opposite sex.90 However, the primary criteria which
medical professionals use in diagnosing GID involves evidence of a
strong and persistent desire to be a member of the opposite sex,
which accompanies a persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex
and entails significant distress or impairment of functioning in soci
ety.91 The definitions adopted by courts are consistent with medical
definitions and stress the discomfort associated with the illness.92
The Supreme Court definition of transsexual is "one who has '[a]
rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncom
fortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically seeks
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to
bring about a permanent sex change."93
GID seriously affects the lives of those who suffer from it and
is considered by the majority of the medical community to be bio
88. See id.
89. See Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5
TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 27,29-30 (1995) (noting that while courts use the two
terms interchangeably, gender dysphoria is a broad term, and transsexualism is a partic
ular type of gender dysphoria).
90. MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION, Home Edition, Sect. 7, Mental
Health Disorders. ch. 87.
91. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV-TR: Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 578 [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR).
92. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,829 (1994). See also Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing transsexualism as "a
condition that exists when a physiologically normal person (i.e., not a hermaphrodite 
a person whose sex is not clearly defined due to a congenital condition) experiences
discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her particular sex and prefers to
be the other sex"); PhiIIips v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 793 (W.D. Mich.
1990) (describing the plaintiffs disorder as "discomfort and rejection of one's gender
based on physical characteristics and sex assigned at birth").
93. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 (citation omitted).
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logical and innate. Adults with GID may exhibit an intense desire
to not only take on the physical characteristics of the opposite sex,
but also to adopt the social role associated with that gender. 94 The
uncomfortable feelings associated with GID may lead adults to
"adopt the behavior, dress, and mannerisms of the other sex."95 It
is difficult to determine how prevalent GID is; however, statistics
from smaller European countries have shown thOat roughly 1 per
30,000 adult males and 1 per 100,000 adult females seek the ulti
mate in treatment for the illness: sex-reassignment surgery.96
GID commonly affects relationships, and "many individuals
with GID become socially isolated."97 In some instances, the condi
tion can be so great that it affects nearly every aspect of the per
son's life. Eventually, the person's everyday life may center around
only those activities that tend to decrease the associated stressful
feelings. 98 GID can also lead to incidents of substance abuse and
attempted suicide. 99 In extreme cases, individuals with GID might
also attempt self-castration or mutilation of genitals. !0O
GID is treatable. While psychotherapy is considered helpful, it
is not intended to cure the illness, nor is it one of the three standard
treatments according to the Standards of Care .101 The Standards of
Care, which is considered to be the generally accepted course of
treatment in the medical community, establish three types of treat
ment options: (1) hormone therapy;102 (2) real-life experience;103
94. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 91, at 577.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 579. See also HARRY BENJAMIN, INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA
ASSOCIATION, THE STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 17 (Sym
posium Publishing, 5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter THE STANDARDS OF CARE] (providing
information concerning the prevalence of GID and presenting data from Holland,
which provides that "1 in 11,900 males and 1 in 30,400 females" may be afflicted with
the illness).
97. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 91, at 578.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. ld
101. THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 27-28.
102. Id. at 32. Hormone therapy involves the use of hormones, generally andro
gen for females with GID and estrogens for males, for the purpose of allowing the
patient to take on physical characteristics of the opposite sex and thereby relieve the
distress associated with the illness.
103. The real-life experience treatment option is considered "essential" if the goal
of treatment is a complete transition and involves allowing the patient to "fully adopt a
new or evolving gender role or gender presentation in everyday life." Id. at 30. See also
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing THE STANDARDS OF
CARE throughout the opinion). A patient's real-life experience, as a member of the
opposite sex, is ordinarily supplemented with hormones and requires the patient to con
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and (3) sex-reassignment surgery.104
The aim of the different treatment options is to provide "per
sonal comfort with the gendered self in order to maximize overall
psychological well-being and self-fulfillment."105 The treatment op
tions are intended to be flexible and indiVidualized in order to en
sure the best possible result for the patient. However, when the
patient is a prisoner, the responsible officials in charge of maintain
ing an orderly prison may not be willing to be as flexible as the
Standards of Care suggest - especially when issues like security,
politics and expense arise. The next part of this Note examines four
early decisions that considered some of the difficult issues inherent
in the incarceration of transsexuals.
A.

Legal Actions by Prisoners Involving Gender Identity
Disorder

Many courts that have dealt with legal claims brought by plain
tiffs experiencing GID have considered the condition valid and seri
ous.1°6 However, in Lamb v. Maschner,107 the court's difficulty in
grasping the seriousness of GID was evident. The plaintiff claimed
to be transsexual, sought transfer to a female facility, and requested
that the prison provide cosmetics and female clothing. 108 In dis
cussing whether the plaintiff was in fact a transsexual, the court did
duct his or her everyday life, be it at work, at school, or in the community, in the gender
role of the opposite sex. THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 30.
104. For individuals suffering from severe or profound OlD, sex-reassignment
surgery may be appropriate after the patient has received a "comprehensive evaluation
by a qualified medical health professional." THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96,
at 37. The medical community does not consider sex-reassignment surgery experimen
tal, investigational, elective, cosmetic, or by any means optional. Id. The procedure is
invasive and requires radical alteration of the genitals for the purpose of providing the
patient with the physical characteristics of the opposite sex. Id. at 37-38. Sex-reassign
ment surgery can only be prescribed after all the relevant factors have been thoroughly
assessed.
105. [d. at 3.
106. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (finding deliberate indiffer
ence test appropriate in case involving transsexual inmate); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d
322, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1988) (identifying the condition as "transsexualism" and reiterat
ing the notion that "transsexualism is a very complex medical and psychological prob
lem") (citation omitted); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[T]reatment of a psychiatric or psychological condition may present a 'serious medi
cal need' under the Estelle formulation. There is no reason to treat transsexualism dif
ferently than any other psychiatric disorder.").
107. 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986).
108. [d. at 353. The issue of whether the plaintiff was in fact a transsexual was
disputed by the parties who submitted conflicting medical records. [d. The court de
cided the case, assuming arguendo, that the plaintiff was a transsexual. [d.
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take into account that the prisoner had inflicted a laceration to his
scrotum. 109 However, the court did not consider the incident indic
ative of mental illness but rather illustrative of the plaintiff's charac
ter as a "non-conformist."110 Such reasoning demonstrates the lack
of understanding that often accompanies claims involving GID and
its unique manifestations.
The early case of Supre v. Ricketts 111 illustrated not only some
of the complex issues involved with incarcerating transsexuals, but
also the confusion which can exist in regards to GID. The facts of
the case reveal that the inmate-plaintiff was in need of psychologi
cal attention 112 and had been targeted by other inmates in part be
cause of his feminine characteristics. 113 During the plaintiff's
incarceration, he "engaged in various forms of mutilation of his sex
organs."114 The repeated self-mutilation resulted in severe damage,
which caused the plaintiff to undergo surgery in order to remove his
testicles. 115 In the aftermath of surgery, prison medical staff re
fused to prescribe the inmate hormones, despite recommendations
for hormone therapy given by outside medical professionals.1 16
The Tenth Circuit found the disagreement among the medical
professionals regarding hormone treatment to be a reflection of the
controversial nature of treating GID.u 7 Further disagreement illus
trating not only the difficulty in treating GID, but also in litigating
cases involving GID can be seen in the different interpretations
taken by the district court and the court of appeals in deciding
whether the prison officials acted appropriately. Whereas the dis
trict court found that the prison failed to provide minimal treatment
by not administering low cost estrogen hormones,11s the Tenth Cir
Id. at 354.
Id. (dismissing claim because deliberate indifference on the part of the
prison could not be shown).
111. 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit's decision involved whether
the inmate plaintiff could be considered a "prevailing party" for purposes of deciding
the appropriateness of the district court's award of attorney fees. Id. Nonetheless, the
court made interesting statements regarding the treatment of prisoners with GID. The
underlying suit involved a transsexual inmate who claimed the treatment offered by the
prison was not adequate and therefore constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.
112. Id. at 960.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 963.
118. Supre v. Ricketts, 596 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Although it
would not be reasonable to expect the prison system to finance an expensive sex change
109.

110.
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cuit found the prison official's medical recommendations to be in
formed and adequate.u 9 Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish a
valid Eighth Amendment claim. 120
The decisions in Lamb and Supre did little in the way of ad
dressing the issues involved with incarcerating persons with GID.121
The case that established at least some meaningful precedent came
soon after Lamb and Supre. In Meriwether v. Faulkner,122 the
plaintiff was a convicted murderer who had undergone extensive
surgical augmentation prior to incarceration, which resulted in most
of his123 physical characteristics resembling that of a female. 124 The
inmate had received estrogen therapy for nine years under medical
supervision prior to incarceration. 125 The plaintiff, similar to the
plaintiffs in Lamb and Supre, alleged insufficient medical treat
ment. 126 The plaintiff also claimed the he had been humiliated by
the Medical Director at the prison.127 Despite a prior diagnosis of
gender dsyphoria made at the beginning of incarceration, the plain
tiff was denied medical treatment. 128
Unlike Lamb and Supre, where both plaintiffs received some
sort of medical treatment, the court in Meriwether found that there
"had been a total failure to provide any kind of medical attention at
a11."129 In discussing the inadequacy of the treatment, the court
operation, minimal treatment was not being administered to the plaintiff; the cost of
plaintiff's female hormones was approximately $10 a month.").
119. Id. at 963.
120. Id. ("[T]he Department of Corrections made an informed judgment as to the
appropriate form of treatment and did not deliberately ignore plaintiffs medical needs.
The medical decision not to give plaintiff estrogen until further study does no represent
cruel and unusual punishment.").
121. The Lamb and Supre decisions can also be seen as deferential to prison ad
ministrators' discretion when faced with issues relating to the treatment of prisoners
with GID. In Supre, the plaintiffs sentence was ultimately commuted because the
prison considered the inmate to be a "management problem." [d. at 961. Similarly, the
plaintiff in the Lamb case was eventually removed by transferring him to the State
Security Hospital, where he underwent medical treatment. Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F.
Supp. 351,354 (D. Kan. 1986).
122. 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. [d. at 409 n.1. The Court used feminine pronoun because plaintiffs counsel
referred to inmate as "she," and during review of a dismissal, a court must accept fac
tual allegations as true. [d.
124. Id. at 410 (noting the "surgical augmentation of her facial structure, breasts,
and hips so as to alter her body shape to resemble that of a biological female").
125. Id. (treatments caused the plaintiffs chemical castration).
126. [d.
127. Id. The plaintiff alleged that prison's medical director had told her he would
"make sure" she never received estrogen while in prison. [d.
128. [d.
129. [d. at 414.
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found that GID did constitute a serious medical need and thus
could be reviewed under Eight Amendment scrutiny.130 The case is
important therefore because it recognized the seriousness of GID;
however, because of its procedural posture, the decision did little
more.131
Another noteworthy decision regarding the treatment of pris
oners with GID was made by the Seventh Circuit in Maggert v.
Hanks.132 The complaint in this case stemmed from a prisoner's
dissatisfaction over a prison psychiatrist's refusal to provide es
trogen therapy.B3 The psychiatrist did not find that the prisoner
suffered from gender dsyphoria. 134 Therefore, the court upheld the
lower court's dismissal of the suit because the plaintiff failed to
show that there was a genuine medical condition present.135 In af
firming, the Seventh Circuit went on to address broader issues in
volving prisoner's civil rights in relation to the treatment of gender
identity disorders.B 6 While this portion of the opinion is mostly
dicta, it is interesting to consider the economic justification used to
resolve whether a prison's denial of hormone therapy would rise to
level of cruel and unusual. 137
In recognizing gender dysphoria as a serious medical disorder,
the court did not refer to medical literature or case law. Instead, it
considered the great physical and financial sacrifice that a person
suffering from the condition must undergo in order to alleviate the
associated pain. 138 In commenting on the extent of a prison's duty
130. Id. at 413 ("There is no reason to treat transsexualism differently than any
other psychiatric disorder. Thus contrary to the district court's determination, plain
tiff's complaint does state a 'serious medical need."').
131. Id. at 410. The Meriwether court was only concerned with whether the dis
trict court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim was proper and reviewed the dismissal
assuming the plaintiff's allegations to be true.
132. 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997).
133. Id. at 670-71.
134. Id. at 671 ("The psychiatrist does not believe that Maggert suffers from gen
der dysphoria, although he acknowledges that Maggert's 'sexual identity is polymor
phous and his sexual aims ambiguous."').
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 672.
138. Id. at 671. Maggert referred to gender dysphoria as "the condition in which
a person believes that he is imprisoned in a body of the wrong sex" and went on to refer
to the illness as "a serious psychiatric disorder, as we know because the people afflicted
by it will go to great lengths to cure it if they can afford the cure." [d. The court also
recognized the surgical procedure involved in GID cases and commented that,
"[s]omeone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound psy
chiatric disorder." Id.
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to treat a prisoner's GID, Judge Posner found the expense of the
surgical treatment option important139 and discussed the expense
factor in light of the 'Eighth Amendment's guarantee of medical
treatment. 140 It was clear to Judge Posner that a prisoner's entitle
ment of minimal care cannot be stretched to include a costly surgi
cal treatment option. 141 However, the court did state that a prison,
in certain special circumstances, may be required to provide costly
medical treatment to a prisoner suffering from GID.1 42 In the end,
this possibility was considered highly unlikely due to the rarity of
the condition and its lack of acceptance and awareness in the
community.143
The Maggert opinion demonstrated the Seventh Circuit's con
cern over the obvious inequity that would arise if convicts were pro
vided with expensive medical treatment unavailable to most law
abiding citizens.144 This and other related problems are challeng
ing. Difficult issues surely arise for those responsible for the care
and treatment of transsexual inmates. Determining how much a
prison staff must do in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation to
a transsexual inmate can be quite complicated, as the facts of the
Kosilek case illustrate.

III.

CASE DISCUSSION

Kosilek's demands for medical treatment began during deten
tion in the county jail.1 45 At his own expense Kosilek was allowed
139. Id. In commenting on the extent of the prison's constitutional obligation
towards the medical needs of the prisoner, the courted stated "it does not follow that
prisons have a duty to authorize the hormonal and surgical procedures that in most
cases at least would be necessary to 'cure' a prisoner's gender dysphoria. Those proce
dures are protracted and expensive." Id.
140. Id. ("A prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner
medical care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an
affluent free person. He is only entitled to minimum care.") (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 672 ("Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that
only the wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. ").
142. Id.
143. Id. ("Gender dysphoria is not, at least not yet, generally considered a severe
enough condition to warrant expensive treatment at the expense of others than the
person suffering from it. ").
144. Id. In its discussion of the cost of the treatment, which "can easily reach
$100,000" id., the court expressed concern over the possibility that severely ill individu
als might commit crimes as a means of obtaining medical treatment. The court explic
itly stated: "We do not want transsexuals committing crimes because it is the only route
to obtaining a cure." Id.
145. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002). The record

2005]

KOS[LEK V. MALONEY

241

to consult with a medical expert qualified to treat GID.146 The
medical expert's recommendation, which involved psychotherapy
with a qualified practitioner in treating GID, was not followed by
the Sheriff. 147 It was also during his stay in jail that Kosilek at
tempted to castrate himself and where he attempted suicide
twice. 148 Kosilek's demands for treatment continued after his con
viction and transfer to the medium-security male prison at MCI
N orfolk. 149
Ultimately, Kosilek requested the court issue an injunction re
quiring that the prison treat his condition with a qualified medical
professional according to recognized medical standards. 150 The
court realized that Kosilek's risk of harm was great and accepted
that his GID was the cause of his severe emotional distress. 151 The
court then considered whether deliberate indifference had occurred
in a systematic manner, paying particular attention to the course of
treatment Kosilek actually received.
A.

The Objective Analysis Under the Deliberate Indifference
Standard

In order to decide on the validity of the constitutional issue
involved, the court needed to assure that "Kosilek had a genuine
[GID] and, if so, what the recommended treatment would be if
Kosilek were not incarcerated."152 The DOC retained a GID ex
pert, Dr. Forstein, who concluded that Kosilek did have GID and
recommended psychotherapy with a qualified therapist. 153 In addi
tion, Forstein recommended that Kosilek receive female hormones,
consult with a specialist in sexual reassignment, and have access to
personal items such as makeup.154 At the core of the recommenda
tion was concern over Kosilek's potential suicidality if his condition
revealed that Kosilek had intense feelings causing him to believe that his gender is
female from a young age. [d. at 163. Despite the severe distress caused by these intense
feelings, Kosilek did not seek medical treatment prior to incarceration, although there
had been one period where Kosilek did use female hormones and for the first time in
his life "felt normal." [d. In the late 1960s, Kosilek prostituted himself to a physician in
exchange for the female hormones. [d.
146. [d. at 164.
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. [d.
150. [d. at 166.
151. [d. at 164-65.
152. [d. at 168.
153. [d.
154. [d.
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was not treated. 155 The doctor's report to the DOC included his
belief that there was "a great risk for self harm, perhaps mutilation,
if not suicide."156 The doctor's recommendations were not followed
by the prison medical staff.157
Kosilek's medical treatment was at all times subject to the dis
cretion of the DOC medical staff.158 The medical staff met with
Commissioner Maloney in order to discuss Kosilek's demands,159
and it was clear to the medical staff from the outset of their involve
ment that Maloney did not want to provide Kosilek with hormones
or surgery.160 The medical personnel, who had no experience in
treating GID, then attempted to establish a GID policy in response
to Kosilek's legal action. 161
Relying on the medical staff's research 162 and legal advice
given by DOC attorneys,163 Maloney adopted a "freeze-frame" pol
icy to deal with Kosilek and future issues involving the treatment of
those with GID.164 The "freeze-frame" approach was outlined by a
memorandum prepared by one of the prison doctors, Dr. Packer. 165
Under the new policy,
[t]he DOC would provide hormones to any inmate who had pre
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 168-69 (noting that the DOC medical personnel were comprised of a
psychiatrist, who was also the director of the program that treated prisoners' mental
health problems, and a doctor of the medical school that was contractually bound to
provide mental health care to prisoners).
159. Id. at 169.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 170.
162. Id. at 169-70. Dr. Packer's recommendation was based on an article by Dr.
Robert Dickey. Id. at 169 (citing Dr. Robert Dickey et aI., Transsexuals with the Prison
System: An International Survey of Correctional Services Policies, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
219 (1996)). The article stated that no prisons surveyed had a policy allowing sex reas
signment surgery. Id. In the article, Dr. Dickey claimed that the "freeze frame" ap
proach was a sound way of dealing with the management of transsexuals. Id. The court
pointed out that Packer's memorandum, which purported to provide "the gist of the
article," id., did not include relevant information such as the fact "that twenty-seven of
the sixty-four jurisdictions surveyed stated that they would decide on a case-by-case
basis whether to initiate hormone therapy for an inmate and three more jurisdictions
stated that they would consider initiating such treatment reasonable." Id. at 170.
163. Id. During a meeting with his attorneys "Maloney was told that no reported
case had held that the Constitution required initiating hormones for a prisoner not tak
ing hormones before being incarcerated. Rather, he was told that court decisions indi
cated that mental health counseling was sufficient treatment for an inmate with a
gender identity disorder." Id.
164. Id. at 171.
165. Id. at 169.
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viously been prescribed hormones, probably place that person in
the general population of the prison, and deal with any security
issues that might arise. The DOC would not, however, initiate
hormones for an inmate for whom hormones had not been pre
scribed prior to his incarceration. 166
Prior to formal adoption of the guidelines, Maloney. had read
Dr. Forstein's recommendations and was aware of the numerous
risks involved with inadequately treating GID, including acute de
pression, self-mutilation or autocastration, and suicide. 167 DOC
employees who interacted with Kosilek the most, as well medical
experts retained by Kosilek for purposes of trial, agreed that if ade
quate treatment was not provided the future risk of attempted sui
cide would be high.168
The court found the inadequacy of Kosilek's care wholly the
result of a rigid "blanket policy" adopted by Maloney, not because
of sound medical advice, but rather as a result of an administrative
decision. 169 In assessing this decision, the court considered the
agreement among medical experts who concluded that "prohibiting
the initiation of hormones in every case is not appropriate."170
Before concluding that treatment offered by the DOC was inade
quate, the court found it useful to contrast the treatment of GID
with other illnesses. It found that "if an inmate were depressed be
cause he had cancer, the DOC would not limit its efforts to address
ing the depression. Rather, it would also attempt to cure, or at least
diminish, the cancer by providing care that would be regarded as
adequate in the community."I71
In determining whether a valid constitutional claim under the
Eighth Amendment existed, the court made clear that the proper
focus would be on the conduct of Maloney.l72 Maloney's actions
166. ld. at 171 (noting that up to time that the Guidelines were drafted Dr.
Packer was neither aware of the Standards Of Care nor Dr. Forstein's diagnosis).
167. ld. at 171-72.
168. ld. at 165 n.4.
169. [d. at 175. The court stated that:
[N]o clinical assessment of Kosilek's individual circumstances and medical
needs has been made. Rather, major forms of the treatment provided in the
community in the United States pursuant to prudent professional standards
have been eliminated as options by an administrative decision made by Malo
ney, who acknowledges that he is not qualified to decide what treatment is
medically necessary for a particular inmate.
ld.
170. ld.
171. !d.
172. ld. at 168-69.
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would be scrutinized not merely because he was the Commissioner
of the DOC, but because he effectively made all major decisions
concerning the treatment of Kosilek.173 It was Maloney's adminis
trative decision that essentially circumscribed Kosilek's treatment
and restricted the professional judgment of DOC medical person
nel,174 Despite Maloney's admitted lack of medical expertise,175 it
was his decision that controlled Kosilek's treatment; thus, deliber
ate indifference would have to be shown on the part of Maloney.176
1.

Kosilek Met the Objective Requirements of Deliberate
Indifference

In finding that Kosilek's GID was serious enough to warrant
treatment, the court made certain to recognize that not every pris
oner with GID could state a valid claim under the Eighth Amend
ment.177 The facts presented in this case, however, demonstrated
that Kosilek's mental illness was indeed severe. 178 Besides the
medical diagnoses of two different experts, the court considered the
past instances of attempted suicide and mutilation as relevant to the
issue of establishing a serious medical need,179 and the court consid
ered the potential danger of suicide and self-mutilation still ongo
ing.180 The court also considered prior case law and found the facts
of the case more similar to Meriwether, where no informed medical
judgment had been made, and less similar to the cases of Supre and
Lamb where the prisoners had received some form of medical
173. Id. The court stated that:
[T]he decisions on how to deal with Kosilek and any other prisoner suffering
from a gender identity disorders was, as a practical matter, made by Maloney
in his capacity as the Commissioner of the DOC .... Therefore, Maloney is
the person on whom the court must focus in determining whether the deliber
ate indifference required to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment
has been proven in this case.
Id.
174. Id. at 175.
175. Id. at 169 ("Maloney testified ... that he was not qualified to make medical
judgments.").
176. Id. ("[I]t is necessary to focus on Maloney's state of mind to determine
whether deliberate indifference has been proven.").
177. Id. at 184 ("[Ge ]nder identity disorders have differing degrees of severity
.... [S]ome individuals with gender identity disorders manage to find their own com
fortable, effective ways of living ....").
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)) ("Someone
so eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric
disorder. ").
180. Id.
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care. 181
The facts revealed that the DOC deviated from its customary
practice of retaining a medical expert in cases where the DOC staff
was unqualified in dealing with a particular medical issue - which
was the case with GID.182 The court ultimately found that Kosilek's
medical treatment was determined not by qualified medical profes
sionals or the medical staff within the DOC, but rather by Malo
ney.183 The court found the Guidelines, which Maloney instituted,
to be, in effect, a total prohibition of any actual treatment. l84 The
combination of the severity of Kosilek's illness, the lack of any real
medical treatment, and the rigid policy adopted by Maloney
amounted to a failure to provide adequate or even essential care. 185
Thus, the court found the objective component of the deliberate
indifference analysis satisfied. 186
B.

The Subjective Component of the Deliberate Indifference
Standard

In evaluating the subjective component of deliberate indiffer
ence, the court wisely bifurcated the analysis. Relying on Farmer,
the court first sought to determine whether Maloney knew of a sub
stantial risk to Kosilek's health or safety; if he did know of a sub
stantial risk, the court then needed to establish if Maloney
disregarded that risk. 187 The majority in Farmer, to the dismay of
the dissent, established that "an official's failure to alleviate a sig
nificant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as
the infliction of punishment."188 The facts presented in Kosilek il
lustrated this type of case. 189
1.

Was Maloney Aware of Facts From Which to Infer Risk
to Kosilek?

The court concluded that Maloney was aware of the relevant
facts surrounding Kosilek's circumstances, which could have ena
181.
182.
183.
184.

[d. at 186.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 188-89.
[d. at 189.
[d.
[d. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994».

185.
186.
187.
188.
189. [d.
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bled him to infer the existence of a significant risk to the health and
well being of Kosilek. l90 The facts that the court found relevant to
this determination were that Maloney had read Dr. Forstein's re
port and recommendations, which included concern regarding the
great risk of attempted suicide by Kosilek. 191 Moreover, Maloney
had been made aware of the significant risks of harm that could
result by inadequately treating a GID.192 These facts demonstrated
that "Maloney was aware of facts from which he could have in
ferred that there was an excessive risk to Kosilek's health."193
Therefore, one of the two elements of the subjective component of
the deliberate indifference standard had been satisfied.
2.

Did Maloney Form the Belief That There Was a
Substantial Risk of Serious Harm to Kosilek?

The facts presented could not demonstrate that the lack of
medical attention caused by Maloney's inflexible policy was due to
deliberate indifference. 194 Deliberate indifference could not be
shown partially because Maloney relied on prison procedures al
ready in place, which protected against the possibility of prisoner
suicide.195 Interestingly, the court considered Maloney's lack of
medical expertise a pertinent factor in his inability to appreciate the
risks associated with Kosilek's GID.196 The court also took into ac
count Maloney's request of legal advice in assessing whether delib
erate indifference could be shown. 197 In the end, the facts
presented were analogous to a scenario depicted by Justice
O'Connor in her Farmer concurrence. The court found that Malo
ney "knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that
the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexis
tent. "198 This type of knowledge could not support a finding of de
liberate indifference; therefore, the court concluded that Maloney
had not acted with the requisite intent and entered judgment in Ma
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 191.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (noting that DOC attorneys had informed Maloney that no transsexual
prisoner had been successful in arguing that the exclusion of hormone therapy was un
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
198. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994».
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loney's favor. 199
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

It is evident from the opinion that the court thoroughly as
sessed all relevant facts before concluding that Maloney had not
acted with the requisite subjective motivation sufficient to support a
finding of deliberate indifference. 2oo The level of the court's in
depth examination of the complex issues presented had not been
achieved by prior federal court decisions. The purpose of this sec
tion is to discuss the most important findings and recommendations
made in the court's well-reasoned decision.

A.

The Constitutional Obligation to Provide Treatment for GID

In certain situations, severe GID may pose a significant risk to
a prisoner's health and safety; therefore, responsible prison officials
should be cautious when incarcerating such an individual. The
court in Kosilek appropriately found that GID is not "necessarily a
serious medical need."201 GID, like most illnesses, has varying de
grees of severity. But GID is similar to other potentially serious
psychological conditions; thus, prison officials may have a constitu
tional obligation to provide adequate treatment after a proper diag
nosis has occurred. 202 Like previous decisions, Kosilek affirmed
that an inmate with GID may require a responsible prison official
to provide adequate care. 203 Similar to Meriwether, the court in
199. Id. at 191-95.
200. Id at 189.
20l. Id. at 184. See also Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("[M]erely because someone is a transsexual, it does not inexorably follow that he or
she needs psychotherapy .... Farmer had no guarantee of psychotherapy for transsexu
alism absent a demonstrated need.").
202. See, e.g., Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F. Supp. 930, 938-39 (N.D. Ill. 1981). For
the Lane court, there was no reason to treat mental illness differently than a physical
ailment.
Mental illness, like physical illness, occasions pain and suffering in the af
flicted. The refusal to treat, in combination with the state's conduct in confin
ing the individual in a manner that prevents him from getting any help on his
own, therefore amounts to the infliction or aggravation of pain and suffering.
Id at 938 (citing Comment, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth
Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 747 (1978)). The court went on to cite
numerous other courts that had adopted this rationale. Id.
203. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). In a claim
brought by an incarcerated transsexual, the Meriwether court found that the plaintiff
had pleaded facts "which, if proven, would entitle her to some kind of medical treat
ment." Id. However, the court proceeded to limit its holding by stating: "It is important
to emphasize ... that she does not have a right to any particular type of treatment ...."
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Kosilek found it difficult to justify a failure to provide treatment for
GID where a similar decision to not provide treatment for a differ
ent illness, for example cancer or schizophrenia, would almost
surely be a violation of the Eighth Amendment.204 Indeed, it is
very difficult to attempt to distinguish one potentially serious
mental illness, which would require treatment under the Eighth
Amendment, from a severe case of GID. Therefore, when the in~
carceration of inmates who may have severe GID is at issue, the
best approach for prison officials would be to receive an evaluation
by a competent medical professional in order to determine the ex
tent of the prison's duty of care. This approach, besides being the
least risky from the prison official's perspective, is best in terms of
policy and logic.
The Kosilek case teaches that responsible officials charged with
the care of a transsexual inmate should at least foster the opportu
nity for a competent medical evaluation. 205 Of course, this possibil
ity does not necessarily mean that prisons will be obligated to pay
for costly sex reassignment surgery. Prisons are only required to
provide adequate treatment. Adequate treatment, for many indi
viduals, may only require psychotherapy.206 Kosilek, however, in
structs that the decision as to proper treatment must be made by
medical professionals - not prison officials or the inmate. 207 The
well-established rule, which prevents liability when there is mere
disagreement with the treatment provided, safeguards prisons later
on if an inmate pursues legal action because the recommended
treatment is less then what he or she hoped to receive. 2og But, as
Id. See also Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Wolfe v. Hom, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Courts have consistently considered transsexualism
a 'serious medical need' for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
204. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 188. In Kosilek, the court considered how the
prison might have treated Kosilek if his illness had been cancer and concluded the
prison policies were inconsistent. Id. ("As Hughes, testified, if Kosilek had cancer, and
was depressed and suicidal because of that disease, the DOC would discharge its duty
to him under the Eighth Amendment by treating both his cancer and his depression.").
Likewise, in Meriwether, the court found it hard to distinguish between illnesses. Mer~
iwether, 821 F.2d at 413 ("There is no reason to treat transsexualism differently from
than any other psychiatric disorder.").
205. See supra note 15.
206. See THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 27-28.
207. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
208. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). In affirming the
general understanding among courts, Chance held it "well-established that mere disa
greement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as
the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treat
ment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." Id.
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Kosilek and other cases demonstrate, prison officials choosing not
to provide any competent evaluation run the risk of violating the
Eighth Amendment - and legal challenges based on these grounds
will often be able to at least survive a summary judgment
hearing. 209
B.

Rigid Prison Administrative Policies Do Not Provide
Sufficient Solutions

In assessing the objective factors under the deliberate indiffer
ence standard, the court considered the administrative decisions
made by Maloney and the policies instituted in order to deal with
Kosilek's needs. 210 Although the DOC revised a former policy to
allow for the possibility of psychotropic medications to be pre
scribed in the future, the court still found the new treatment plan
deficient in terms of adequately treating Kosilek's illness. 211
This is one of the important findings made by the court and, in
part, demonstrates that rigid administrative policies will not always
be appropriate when dealing with inmates with OID.212 The court
came to its conclusion after hearing testimony from qualified medi
cal professionals. 213 The court ultimately found that adequate
treatment of OlD requires an "individualized medical evalua
tion,"214 and it determined that all medical decisions should be the
product of "sound medical judgment, based upon prudent profes
sional standards, particularly the Standards of Care."215 While the
court did allow Mel-Norfolk to continue with the "freeze-frame"
policy adopted by Maloney, it made clear that future decisions re
garding treatment would have to be individualized and not based
209. See Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Brooks, a
recent challenge brought by a transsexual inmate, involved a summary judgment mo
tion. The court concluded that "[p]rison officials are thus obliged to determine whether
Plaintiff has a serious medical need and, if so, to provide him with at least some treat
ment." Id. See also Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86 (D. N.H. 2003);
Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (finding a total failure on the part of the prison based on
the fact that "no informed medical judgment has been made by the DOC concerning
what treatment is necessary to treat adequately Kosilek's severe gender identity disor
der"); Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at
413 (reversing the lower court's finding that plaintiff had not stated a valid Eighth
Amendment claim, which might have entitled her to treatment if proven).
210. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
211. Id. at 174-76.
212. Id. at 175.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 193 (citing Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. Appx. 793,795 (2001)).
215. Id. (citations omitted).
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solely on blanket policy.216
The court found the DOC's policy regarding the treatment of
GID distinct from its policy relating to the treatment of other seri
ous illnesses. 217 The reason for the distinction between the DOC's
policies is hard to reconcile and troublesome in light of other court
decisions. The Second Circuit has suggested that the decisions re
lating to prisoners' medical care should be the product of "sound
medical judgment. "218 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has found that
medical decisions that are not based on "individualized medical
evaluation" create triable issues as to the determination of deliber
ate indifference. 219 Most recently, a federal district court in New
York found that "[p]rison officials cannot deny transsexual inmates
all medical treatment simply by referring to a prison policy which
makes a seemingly arbitrary distinction between inmates who were
and were not diagnosed with GID prior to incarceration."22o These
decisions, at a minimum, demonstrate that the adoption of a rigid
administrative policy does not absolve prison administrators from
the Eighth Amendment's requirements. 221
Policies which severely restrict treatment options, and which
do not provide opportunity for an individualized medical evalua
tion, may run counter to notions underlying the Eighth Amend
ment. 222 This may be especially true, as Kosilek illustrates, when
facts and circumstances indicate that a prisoner has a medical con
dition that poses a serious risk of harm to either themselves or
other inmates. In contrast, policies with some flexibility, which pro
vide opportunity for evaluation by professionals who implement
medical procedures similar to those practiced in the community, do
not present a similar risk. These notions prove true when one con
siders the guiding principle of the Amendment, which involves
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur
ing society."223 Certainly medicine, and especially the study of
216. Id.
217. Id. at 176.
218. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998).
219. Allard, 9 Fed. Appx. at 795.
220. Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
221. See Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (D. N.H. 2003) (illustrating
the most recent acceptance of this idea). The Bartlett court cited Kosilek when it stated
that: "A blanket policy that prohibits a prison's medical staff from making a medical
determination of an individual inmate's medical needs and prescribing and providing
adequate care to treat those needs violates the Eighth Amendment." Id.
222. Id. See also Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 181-83.
223. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958».
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mental illness, is constantly developing, and congruently, society
becomes more aware of different types of illness and their potential
seriousness. If prison policies do not provide enough flexibility, by
not accounting for such inevitable medical progress, Eighth
Amendment challenges will have a greater likelihood of success as
prisoners will claim that the failure to provide opportunity for indi
vidualized attention creates a "substantial risk of serious harm."224
If prison officials adopted Kosilek's preferred method of pro
viding opportunity for individualized evaluations it would be diffi
cult for a prisoner-plaintiff to establish a valid constitutional
violation under the Eighth Amendment. In Kosilek, the court con
sidered Maloney's belief that existing DOC procedures would pre
vent serious harm to Kosilek relevant in deciding the issue of
deliberate indifference. 225 The court ultimately found that the pro
cedures were incapable of accomplishing this purpose. 226 In order
to avoid this uncertainty, as to whether a prison policy provides
constitutionally adequate measures of safety and care, the Kosilek
opinion seems to offer a reasonable solution. Prison officials
should secure themselves from potential liability by adopting poli
cies that can surely be seen as adequate when measured under the
microscope of deliberate indifference. This can be almost certainly
be achieved by allowing inmates the opportunity for individualized
medical attention with a qualified professional experienced in the
treatment of GID. Kosilek can thus be seen as a warning to prison
officials - "an Eighth Amendment violation may be established by
proof of failure to adjust an established policy to accommodate a
serious medical need. "227
C.

Political Considerations

In analyzing Maloney's decision-making process, the court
found that the DOC Commissioner erroneously considered the po
tential of politically controversial consequences. 228 Maloney's con
224. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
225. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87.
226. Id. at 188-90.
227. Id. at 186 (finding this point implicit in Mahan v. Plymouth County House of
Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995».
228. Kosilek determined that "Maloney has not been influenced by the possibility
that treatment for Kosilek might be expensive. Rather, he has been concerned that any
expenditure for hormones or sex reassignment surgery might be an inappropriate use of
taxpayers' money." Id. at 162. The court also noted that "Maloney believed that pro
viding Kosilek with hormones or sex reassignment surgery would raise security issues,
and be politically controversial and unpopular." Id. at 191.
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cern over political controversy was not directly related to the
expense of the treatment requested by Kosilek. 229 Rather, the
court found that Maloney believed it would be an "inappropriate
use of taxpayers' money" to provide treatment, such as hormones
or surgery.230 The court considered this factor improper where the
pertinent issue involved the extent of medical treatment Kosilek
was to receive and found political controversy a poor excuse for
denying the constitutional right to adequate medical care. 231 Ac
cording to Kosilek, prison officials need not consider political
ramifications, or political fallout, regarding their decisions to pro
vide medical care. 232
The rationale for the court's position concerning the role of
political consequences was clearly expressed when it stated that
[t]he Bill of Rights provides citizens, including those who are in
carcerated, with certain rights that even a majority of their con
temporaries cannot properly decide to violate. Prison officials
share with the courts the duty to protect those rights, even if they
believe that it may be unpopular to do SO.233
This powerful idea, interpreting the Bill of Rights as specific
guarantees that may not be abridged even when a popular majority
might disagree with the course of action, is at the heart of
Kosilek. 234 This idea represents an important aspect of the Kosilek
opinion and should be appreciated, not only by courts, but also by
prison administrators. Determining the level of treatment to which
a prisoner, and especially a murderer, is entitled can certainly spark
strong sentiment from even the most apolitical individuals. The
court in Kosilek understood this and wisely attempted to limit the
political influences as much as possible. By focusing solely on the
seriousness of the medical need at issue and the responsiveness of
the DOC, the court adeptly avoided the political trap that Commis
sioner Maloney could not.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 162.
231. Id. at 192 ("[C]oncern for controversy is not a constitutionally permissible
basis for denying an inmate necessary medical care.").
232. Id. at 162.
233. Id.
234. The court's impartial focus on the issues presented is evident throughout the
opinion. Indeed, its quest for objectivity can be gleaned from the following statement:
"Kosilek's claims raise issues involving substantial jurisprudence concerning the appli
cation of the Eighth Amendment to inmates with serious medical needs. This case re
quires the neutral application of the principles that emerge from that jurisprudence to
the facts established by the evidence in this case." Id. at 160.
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A disturbing aspect of the Kosilek case is that Maloney, who
was not a medical professional nor qualified to make decisions re
lating to health care, "effectively precluded qualified professionals"
from providing Kosilek with treatment. 235 In fact, Maloney's ac
tions were based mainly on reasons other than medical considera
tions,236 and the decisions that were made were based primarily on
legal advice given by attorneys, who had informed Maloney that a
court had never required prescription of hormones for a pris
oner. 237 The court found that Maloney would not have allowed
Kosilek to receive hormones, or sex reassignment surgery, "unless
the law required him to do SO"238 and described Maloney's deci
sion-making process as a "major problem" in the case and rightly
SO.239
While the Supreme Court has afforded prison administrators
considerable deference regarding matters of prison security and
regulations involving "legitimate penological interests,"240 the
Court has not, since Estelle, been similarly deferential when a legiti
mate medical need is at issue. 241 Therefore, Kosilek correctly
downplayed the politically controversial issues related to the incar
ceration and treatment of individuals with GID. It becomes diffi
cult and potentially dangerous to justify the prohibition of medical
treatment based on political notions, even otherwise persuasive no
tions such as leaving such decisions to the majority's will. The argu
235. Id. at 191.
236. Id. ("A major problem in this matter is that Kosilek's condition has been
treated primarily as presenting legal issues rather than medical questions.").
237. Id. ("Maloney was substantially influenced by his attorneys' advice that, as
of April 2000, no court had held that the Eighth Amendment required prison officials
to provide hormones for an inmate for whom they had not been prescribed prior to his
incarceration. ").
238. /d.
239. Id. The court recognized that the information given to Maloney by the at
torneys was relevant to the issue of whether Maloney should have been held personally
liable for damages or whether he deserved "qualified immunity." Id. However, the
court explained that the legal advice given to Maloney would not alone have provided
protection from the determination of whether he had the requisite knowledge in deter
mining the issue of deliberate indifference. Id.
240. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-30 (2001) (referencing a four-part
balancing test used to measure the extent to which a regulation impinges upon an in
mate's constitutional rights); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,591 (1984) (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)) ("We reaffirm that 'proper deference to the informed
discretion of prison authorities demands that they, and not the courts, make the difficult
judgments which reconcile conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the
welfare of the prison staff, and the property rights of the detainees."').
241. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 303 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
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ment made by those who would allow prisons or states the right to
prohibit costly medical treatment of inmates cannot be justified
solely on the grounds that a plurality of voters would support such a
decision without compromising notions underlying the Bill of
Rights and Supreme Court precedent.242
The question of whether a "majority of the population [would]
support such a punishment"243 may be useful in determining
whether a specific practice runs counter to "standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."244 However, the is
sue regarding political consequences addressed by Kosilek is
different.
The court found that prison administrators do not have the au
thority to make decisions that ultimately affect an inmate's medical
care because they feel that most citizens in the state might disagree
with the course of action. 245 In the court's view, Maloney had an
inflexible constitutional duty to provide adequate treatment, and
political concerns could not be used to determine what the ade
quate treatment should or should not have been. 246 Reasons of pol
icy and logic justify this conclusion. The appropriateness of costly
medical treatment, in most situations, is an issue of constitutional
magnitude with which courts and legislatures - not prison adminis
trators - are equipped to deal.247 Giving prison officials the author
ity to restrict medical care based on political considerations raises a
242. See Bradley A. Sultan, Note, Transsexual Prisoners: How Much Treatment Is
Enough?, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1195, 1225 (2003). Sultan argues that transsexual pris
oners receive only the most basic medical care and considers whether a popular major
ity would agree with allowing medical treatment for transsexual prisoners. While not
referring to any actual polls or data the author states that "[c]learly ... one may deter
mine that the prohibitions on treatments for the indigent transsexuals are supported by
the majority of Americans ...." Id. at 1224-25.
243. Id. at 1224. Sultan relies on the Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Geor
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which reinstated the death penalty. Id. at 1224 n.211. How
ever, there is a relevant distinction between a majority's acceptance of capital
punishment and whether prisoners should receive costly medical treatment. When cap
ital punishment is imposed it is done through court decision and relates directly to the
crime for which the person has been found gUilty. In contrast, a prison's constitutional
obligation to provide medical treatment has never, since Estelle, been subject to com
promise, challenge, or referendum. Estelle clearly established that the government's
obligation to provide medical treatment was "elementary." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976). In sum, there exists a relevant distinction between the constitutionality
of a specific type of criminal punishment and the constitutionality of depriving prison
ers of medical treatment. The latter issue has never been seriously questioned in toto.
244. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
245. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2002).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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serious threat to Estelle's guarantee of adequate medical treatment,
and the practice should therefore be condemned by courts.
Despite the improper restrictions on Kosilek's treatment,248
Maloney did consider legitimate concerns in handling Kosilek's sit
uation. 249 It was of course reasonable for Maloney to be cautious in
deciding whether an inmate should receive treatment that would
result in the enhancement of female characteristics. 250 Security
concerns are of utmost importantance for all prison administra
tors. 251 Kosilek recognized that prison officials dealing with the is
sue of treating transsexual prisoners will not only have to deal with
the unique medical needs of the prisoner, but also the security is
sues inevitably raised by the housing of a prisoner resembling a
member of the opposite sex. These challenging considerations are
the focus of the next section.

D.

Treating GID Behind Prison Walls and Security Concerns

In Kosilek, the court held that "judgments concerning the care
to be provided to inmates for their serious medical needs generally
must be based on medical considerations."252 The statement begs
the question: when should a prisoner's right to medical care be out
weighed by the security concerns that the treatment brings about?
It may be helpful to first consider this difficult question in the ab
stract, according to Supreme Court case law.
In Whitley v. Albers ,253 the Court found that
the State's responsibility to attend to the medical need of prison
ers does not ordinarily clash with other equally important gov
ernmental responsibilities. Consequently 'deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious illness or injury' can typically be estab
lished or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing
institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other
inmates. 254
Like Wilson, which recognized that deliberate indifference
248. ld. at 161 ("Qualified physicians have never evaluated Kosilek for the pri
mary purpose of prescribing treatment. ").
249. ld. at 162.
250. ld.
251. ld. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,832-33 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993).
252. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (emphasis added).
253. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
254. [d. at 320.
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"depends upon the constraints facing the official,"255 Helling v. Mc
Kinney256 reaffirmed the importance of "the realities of prison ad
ministration."257 Thus, the issue of whether the treatment of GID
clashes with prison administration may be extremely important to
the success or failure of future challenges brought by transsexual
inmates.
In some circumstances, it is plausible that the treatment may
raise genuine security concerns to a level where it must be prohib
ited in order to protect the safety of the transsexual inmate. How
ever, in Kosilek, the court seemed to suggest that this was not the
case. In the closing paragraphs of the opinion, the court implied
that sex reassignment surgery would not necessarily be precluded
given the facts and circumstances involved. 258 The court even sug
gested that if sex reassignment surgery was deemed medically nec
essary in the future, Maloney would have to "consider whether
security requirements make it truly necessary to deny Kosilek ade
quate care."259 Because "Kosilek is already living largely as a fe
male in the general population of a medium security male prison"
and "[t]his has not presented security problems,"26o the court cast
doubt upon Maloney's ability to meet such a burden.
Although the court was not required to decide upon any other
issue besides deliberate indifference, it made interesting recommen
dations to the DOC in order to deal with Kosilek's condition more
effectively in the future.2 61 Unlike previous decisions, the court did
not overlook the inevitable problems that may arise when incarcer
ating transsexual inmates receiving treatment while in prison, and
the court recognized that responsible officials should proceed with
caution. 262 The court took notice of the security issues and Malo
255. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
256. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
257. Id. at 37.
258. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 195 (D. Mass. 2002).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 194.
261. Id. at 193. Finding it unlikely that prison officials would act indifferently
towards Kosilek in the future, the court
expect[ed] that, educated by the trial record and this decision, Maloney and
his colleagues will in the future attempt to discharge properly their constitu
tional duties to Kosilek .... While concerns about security and public contro
versy have made [Maloney] reluctant to do more for Kosilek than the law
requires, the court does not expect that Maloney will be recalcitrant in the
future.
Id.
262. Id. at 193-94.
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ney's sincere concern over the possibility of sexual assault. 263 How
ever, in the end, the court maintained that Kosilek could be
provided with adequate care and pointed to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hudson v. Palmer,264 requiring officials to "take reason
able measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. "265 The court
then suggested that the DOC "make reasonable efforts to incarcer
ate [Kosilek] with a less dangerous population of other
prisoners. "266
Although these suggestions were specific to the facts surround
ing the case, they offer novel and interesting suggestions as to how
prison officials should deal with the incarceration of transsexuals.
Could "reasonable efforts to incarcerate [Kosilek] with a less dan
gerous population"267 include a transfer to a female facility? The
transfer of male transsexual inmates, who are undergoing treat
ment, to a female facility raises one possible option for prison offi
cials;268 however, prison systems place inmates based on rigid
gender classifications; therefore this option seems unrealistic. 269
On the other hand, male transsexuals, like Kosilek, are often
targets of abuse in male facilities. 270 Accordingly, the court's sug
gestion of placing Kosilek in a facility with a less dangerous popula
tion seems reasonable under the circumstances and seems to be the
option with the least potential for problems. 271 Kosilek's transfer to
a facility with less dangerous offenders would lessen the potential
for harm and increase Kosilek's safety and thereby mitigate some of
263. Id. at 170 ("Maloney expressed sincere and serious concerns about security
within the prison if Kosilek or any other inmate were to receive hormones or sex reas
signment surgery. Maloney understood that twenty-five percent of the inmates in his
custody were sex offenders."). See also id. at 194 (clarifying that the court did "not
intend to denigrate the significance of Maloney's security concerns").
264. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
265. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp 2d at 194 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666, 669-70 (D. Me. 1991). In Crosby,
the court considered whether housing a preoperative transsexual with females violates a
clearly established constitutional right. Ultimately, it found the "contours" of the right
to privacy unclear when "it comes to the determination of where to house transsexu
als." [d. at 670.
269. Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners
Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 523-24 (2000).
270. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997); Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 669.
271. Cf. Maggert, 131 F.3d at 672 (suggesting assignment to protective custody
may offer a solution).
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the security concerns. Of course, the transfer should be condi- .
tioned on Kosilek's past behavior and present dangerousness.
Treating GID in prison may be challenging considering the un
usual treatment options. However, the Standards of Care are in
tended to be flexible in order to adapt to the patient's unique
situation.2n Thus, decisions involving a specific course of an in
mate's treatment should ultimately be made on a case-by-case basis.
In some cases, treatment may pose few problems, especially if the
recommended treatment consists only of psychotherapy. But if the
recommended treatment consists of the implementation of hor
mones, prison administrators might want to consider whether it is
possible to place the inmate in a setting that decreases potential
security concerns. It is difficult to come to any real solution when
balancing medical needs with "the realities of prison administra
tion."273 However, Kosilek clearly provides that prisons cannot
simply foreclose the possibility of treatment without potentially
running afoul of the Eighth Amendment.
E.

The Expense of Providing Treatment for GID

Lastly, the court considered the issue of cost. Kosilek directly
challenged the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Maggert, in which Judge
Posner opined on the economic limits that might affect the treat
ment of transsexual prisoners.274 In Kosilek, the judge was not per
suaded by the Seventh Circuit's reliance on cost as a potential
reason to deny the administration of hormone therapy or sex reas
signment surgery.275 The court considered this focus on cost mis
guided and fundamentally inconsistent with precedent.276 The main
flaw in Maggert ultimately had to do with the Supreme Court's de
cision in Estelle. 277 In Maggert, Judge Posner considered the ineq
uity of providing costly treatment to convicts when they would not
be able to afford treatment had they not broken the law. 278 The
court in Kosilek found this argument unconvincing because, in con
trast to law-abiding citizens, prisoners have a right to medical
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

supra note 96, at l.
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993).
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 192 (D. Mass. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
STANDARDS OF CARE,
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care.279 This distinction is important and raises the issue of equity,
which is at the core of most people's disagreement and outrage over
providing treatment to transsexual inmates.
Judge Posner pointed to this inequity in Maggert and had diffi
culty finding any cruelty in denying a prisoner costly treatment. 280
However, it becomes difficult to determine what is, or is not, cruel
and unusual by focusing solely on the expense of treatment. If cost
is the sole criteria, where must society draw the line? Should courts
only allow treatment for illnesses that are inexpensive to treat?
Some might go a step further and argue that Estelle should be over
turned; perhaps convicted criminals deserve no more than the ap
proximately 41.2 million law-abiding Americans who are without
health insurance.
Estelle, however, remains controlling and provides the re
sponse to the questions posed, proper or not: "[E]lementary princi
ples establish the government's obligation to provide medical care
for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. "281 Because the
Supreme Court has never provided economic limitations to this
rule,282 the court in Kosilek could not agree with the reasoning in
Maggert and thus refused to restrict Kosilek's future treatment on
the grounds that it might prove expensive. 283 In defense of its posi
tion, the court pointed to the relatively inexpensive cost of hor
mones and compared the costs associated with the treatment of
GID to other forms of potentially expensive treatments. 284
The court's position relating to the issue of cost is part of the
innovative analysis of the complex legal issues associated with the
incarceration of transsexuals. In sum, the court maintained that the
279. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1970».
280. See Maggert, 131 F. 3d at 672. The Maggert court held that
Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the
wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punish
ment. It is not unusual; and we cannot see what is cruel about refusing a bene
fit to a person who could not have obtained the benefit if he had refrained
from committing crimes.
Id.
281. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
282. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost Defense? Budgetary Constraints as
a Defense in Civil Rights Litigation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 483, 497 (2004) ("The Supreme
Court has done little to resolve the question of whether budgetary constraints can ne
gate culpability and enable a defendant to avoid Eighth Amendment liability.").
283. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
284. Id. ("There is no showing that providing sex reassignment surgery for
Kosilek would be more expensive than the treatments provided to some inmates with
cancer, kidney failure, or any other serious medical condition.").
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treatment of GID should be no different than the treatment of
other medical conditions. 285 Such reasoning is part of what makes
the Kosilek decision noteworthy. Future challenges by transsexual
inmates involving allegations of inadequate treatment will reveal
whether the Kosilek approach becomes influential.
CONCLUSION

GID can be a serious condition, and in some cases the conse
quences of failing to provide adequate treatment can be grave. The
Kosilek opinion offers new and valuable perspectives to the chal
lenging issues that courts, as well as prison administrators, face in
responding to the needs of inmates experiencing moderate to se
vere G ID. Kosilek does not provide all the answers; however, the
decision takes a step forward in the direction of recognizing that
inmates with GID present special issues and, in certain circum
stances, require adequate medical treatment under the Eighth
Amendment. The Kosilek approach comports best with Supreme
Court precedent and with the standards of decency and humanity
that underlie the Eighth Amendment because the court solely con
sidered the medical need at issue without being influenced by
prejudice, cost, or politics.
Nikolas Andreopoulos *

285. Id. at 192 ("[W]e are, fundamentally, a decent people, and decent people do
not allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly from serious illness
or injury.").
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